We introduce an implication-with-possible-exceptions and define validity of rules-with-possible-exceptions by means of the topological notion of a full subset. Our implication-with-possible-exceptions characterises the preferential consequence relation as axiomatized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990]. The resulting inference relation is non-monotonic. On the other hand, modus ponens and the rule of monotony, as well as all other laws of classical propositional logic, are valid-up-to-possible exceptions. As a consequence, the rules of classical propositional logic do not determine the (...) meaning of deducibility and inference as implication-without-exceptions. (shrink)

ONE OF THE intriguing features of Spinoza's well-known work, the Ethics, is its "geometrical method." Even today, there is fundamental disagreement among interpreters concerning practically every aspect of this method. Spinoza's own explicit thoughts about philosophical method are almost exclusively to be found in a short, unfinished work, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, in which Spinoza does not seem to talk about a geometrical method at all.

This article explores the relation between the government and the media in post-apartheid South Africa. An overview is given of key developments and tensions between the government and the media in the first 10 years of democracy and the ethical frameworks underlying the respective positions. An overview of the debate between the so-called "national interest" and the "public interest" is given, and linked to normative ethical frameworks of libertarianism vis-a-vis communitarianism. A mean between the 2 is suggested in the form (...) of mutualism, whereas the necessity for conceptual clarification in debating the relation between the government and the media is emphasized. (shrink)

Startingpoint of the investigation is the Humean idea that the notion and problem of personal identity (and a fortiori of personhood) is best understood not from an epistemological-ontological perspective‚ but in the context of an analysis of ‘the concern we take in ourselves’ as in pride. It turns out that an insight in pride requires an analysis of the paradoxical relation of identification. It is argued that this relation cannot be understood in terms of a conscious strategy from the part (...) of the individual. The analysis shows that identification involves a fundamental passivity of the subject‚ but at the same time requires a certain capacity of distantiation with respect to the object(s) of identification. Pride and the identification(s) going with it‚ involve value-judgments not only concerning the value of the self as identified with certain valuable objects‚ but also concerning the mode of identification. The question is asked by whom and how the criteria of these judgments are determined. An attempt is made to give a rationale for the absence of definitive criteria in this matter. In the last parts of the paper‚ the fundamental passivity of the self in its identification(s) is interpreted as a fundamental ‘vulnerability’ which must somehow be assumed to fully be a person. (It is suggested that the analysis of pride and self-esteem in terms of ‘vulnerability’ could profit from an analysis of gratitude). (shrink)

This collection of papers, celebrating the contributions of Swedish logician Dag Prawitz to Proof Theory, has been assembled from those presented at the Natural Deduction conference organized in Rio de Janeiro to honour his seminal research. Dag Prawitz’s work forms the basis of intuitionistic type theory and his inversion principle constitutes the foundation of most modern accounts of proof-theoretic semantics in Logic, Linguistics and Theoretical Computer Science.

One can assign three different aims to the desire for knowledge : utility, pleasure, truth-for-truth's-sake. Whereas the first two aims have a concretely determinable content and therefore look evident, the third one has been looked upon as strange and problematic : it is not immediately clear what kind of value is defended in this case. Popper is one of the recent defenders of the traditional ideal of truth-for-truth's-sake. He wants to defend the ideal against three positions : a primitive taboo-ridden (...) fear for knowledge and truth, relativism, instrumentalism. Analysing Popper's ethic of cognition we do not agree with the instrumentalist's critique of it. However, precisely in advocating a non-instrumentalist value, Popper's position is not unique, but paradoxically resembles the „primitive” position. Popper's belief that there is an objective or absolute truth is, in his opinion, implied by the belief that the search for knowledge makes sense. We try to show that this thesis of absolute truth is based on a conceptual mistake. In opposition to Popper's view, we sketch a form of relativism avoiding this confusion, without doing away with any concrete possibility of discussion or search for truth. At the same time, we try to understand Popper's aversion to relativism as well as the appeal of his position, in that it is a strange mixture of a heroic cognitive ethic and a desire for imaginary control over the uncontrolable. We argue that the form of relativism we advocate easily and perhaps better fulfilb the „heroic” readiness to forsake security in cognitive matters. (shrink)

t. 1. La déduction transcendentale avant la Critique de la raison pure.--t. 2. La déduction transcendentale de 1781 jusqu'à la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure (1887).--t. 3. La déduction transcendentale de 1787 jusqu'à l'Opus postumum.

This article analyses the complex relationships between the elected parliament and the government.Firstly, effective political participation of the constituency in the election of its parliamentary representatives is limited because of the pre-selection of the candidates by the parties themselves. Secondly, the freedom of the parliament is restricted by the complex network of pressures and counterpressures between legislature and executive. Parliament has recently tried to regain some of its influence by organising special parliamentary inquiry committees and by resorting to professional help (...) for assistance in its legislative work. However, the growing professionalisation might become yet another restriction to the parliamentarians' freedom of political action. Thirdly, parliamentary legislative power is undermined by the subtile way governmental decision making ends in legislation.The mass media seem increasingly unable to translate this complexity to the public. As a result the public becomes more and more indifferent to the functioning of the system, which could endanger the genuine democratic influence of the people in the parliamentary system. (shrink)

The author describes the recent changes of rules and proceedings in the House of Representatives, later on in the Senate and finally in both the new «cultural Assemblees», concerning the existence, the functioning and the importance of parliamentary groups and their leaders.Assimilated to the status of Vice-presidents of their Assembly, the parliamentary leaders are in charge of many responsabilities and more attention is given to the parliamentary group as such rather than to the individual members. Seating the members in the (...) House, allocating to their «mandated» members speaking time in important debates, replacing members of their group in the specialized committees, preparing with the Speaker the public debates, taking full responsability for the material aid provided to their group and their members the many tasks of the parliamentary leaders in the organization of parliamentary work are increasing.Their political functions are much more important. Usually the parliamentary leader sits in the top policy making organs of his party, very often he has had governmental experience and, as a floor leader, intervenes in the important debates.Even if essential differences can be observed between political parties the leader in the Parliament plays an important role as the link between political parties and parliament. (shrink)

This paper is an interpretation of the precise meaning of Spinoza's provocative theses that "right is might", and that the real basis of political and other authority is power. The possibility condition of these radically modern theses — that imply the end of traditional theologico-political thinking — is a peculiar naturalistic theology. At the same time, this paper provides a brief, but thorough introduction to Spinoza's political philosophy. Some aspects of it which are often neglected, such as the intricate relationship (...) beween the law and the mores of the people, are given their due weight. (shrink)

The professionalisation of care has resulted in ever increasing specialisation, use of technical innovations and informatisation. This has had consequences for the level and way of involvement of the care provider vis-à-vis the patient. The result has been growing alienation on the part of the patient and flight into non-classical medicine, as well as frustration on the part of medical personnel, likewise with respect to the reactions of patients.A solution is usually sought in more communication. This might be styled the (...) professional answer to alienation and frustration, whereby ‘the human factor’, it is hoped, can be better accounted for. Enhanced communication implies two elements: 1) to better cater for the feelings of patients by trained communicators, i.e. more openness, more client satisfaction; 2) to better take into account patient rights and to actually implement them.The question is whether measures in terms of communication, geared at enhancing client satisfaction and the implementation of patient rights, are the real answer to the above mentioned alienation and frustration. Perhaps the trouble has deeper reasons and requires taking other dimensions into account such as decency and human dignity, which cannot be captured simply in terms of satisfaction and rights.This would mean that the answer must be sought at a deeper level than communication. This level might be called ‘conversation’ . In the second part of the paper, the possible relationship between care and conversation will be briefly analysed. (shrink)

This article presents an overall view of Hume's philosophy as it can be found in the Treatise. It shows that Hume's position can be called a nonreductionist naturalism. Hume's philosophy is a philosophical anthropology: it begins with a discussion of what is typically human in human understanding, i.e., knowledge and probability or the belief-systems of science and philosophy. Then, morality and politics are retraced as to their origin in emotions and desires. In the final part of the article it is (...) explained in what sense Hume can be called a nonreductionist naturalist. (shrink)

Religion and science are altogether too different to be rationally incompatible . If—as is done here—one defends such a thesis, one seems to sever the link between religion and truth. This link seems to many to be really essential: is not the highest requirement of a person, especially a religious person, „to live in the truth” ? And is it not necessary for rational beings to try and give a rational justification for one's religious beliefs? But perhaps „the truth” which (...) is of such importance to the religious person is not a theoretical truth; perhaps „to live in the truth” is not a matter of trying not to be fooled or of being prepared to change one's views according to new and better information. Furthermore, the desire for independent justification seems either incompatible with religious belief or rather pointless. The link between religion and truth can only be seriously discussed if one understands the relationship between religious beliefs and attitudes like truthfulness, trust, obedience to authority, etcetera. One objection to our position could be that it leads to a kind of „schizophrenic” split or disconnection between religion and the scientific outlook. To this objection we reply that since the arrival of science and technology human life is full of similar kinds of disconnection between non-scientific beliefs and attitudes, and scientific beliefs and technical approaches. To want to conserve science and technology and at the same time to want to restore the „Cosy Universe”-situation, is pure wishful thinking. (shrink)

The Best Trick to Teach Critical Thinking. How philosophy of science and magic make young people resilient to nonsense. In a world of ‘alternative facts’ and fact-free opinions, all readily available through the internet, young people can easily fall prey to nonsense, thus running the risk to act on false information. Critical thinking is usually seen as a remedy against accepting and acting on such falsehoods. Under a pragmatist-naturalist interpretation of science, critical thinking is synonymous with scientific inquiry. Magic tricks (...) in the classroom seem to trigger, in an attractive and accessible way, the scientific process of inquiry in students. Two examples are discussed. Provisional results look promising enough to further explore the use of magic tricks in the classroom to train critical thinking in young people. (shrink)

The argument that automatic processes are responsible for affective/evaluative priming effects has been primarily based on studies that have manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; i.e., the interval between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target). Moreover, these SOA studies provide an insight in the time course of the activation processes underlying automatic affect/attitude activation. Based on a fine-grained manipulation of the SOA employing either the evaluative decision task (Experiment 1) and the pronunciation task (Experiment 2) (...) we concluded that affective priming, and hence automatic affect activation, is based on fast-acting automatic processes. The results of Experiment 3 provide a valid explanation for an apparent discrepancy between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and previous findings. Finally, the results of Experiment 3 support the prediction of Jarvis and Petty (1996) that affective priming effects should be stronger for participants who are more chronically engaged in conscious evaluations. (shrink)

Utopias are much more prone to realization than people would have thought possible, according to Berdiaeff. In the twentieth century, we have witnessed realized totalitarian utopias (such as the ‘really existing socialism’ in East Germany). In the twenty-first century, late modern, capitalist society seems well under way towards the construction of another kind of realized utopianism. Recent developments in today’s health care system (changes in the very meaning of health and care, in medicine and nursing, and even in the ethics (...) of care) all point in the same direction: the growing hold of the utopian mind (the expression is Kolnai’s) on crucial aspects of human life and society. Must we not agree with Berdiaeff that insight in the new ‘realized’ utopianism should induce us to dream ‘of a non-utopian society less “perfect”, but more free’? (shrink)

La conception naturaliste de l'homme comme conatus n'est pas liee chez Spinoza a une conception ethique utilitariste, egoiste ou hedonique. Au contraire, et paradoxalement, elle est susceptible de s'accommoder d'une pensee ethique qui, a son stade le plus developpe, consiste en de tres hautes vertus et des sentiments religieux eleves. Ceci n'est possible que parce que le conatus est interprete comme capable d'une activite libre. Cette liberte est concue, non pas comme une realisation, par la volonte, de valeurs qui seduisent (...) sans necessitation, mais comme une activite emanant de maniere spontanee ou quasi-automatique d'une source autonome, c. a. d. non determinee par l'exterieur. (shrink)